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 ∗ Senior Counsel, Americans United for Life; Author, ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION: THE INSIDE STORY OF ROE V. WADE (Encounter Books 2013). I am 
grateful to Courtney Thiele for her research assistance and for her independent 
review of the studies in the appendices. I am also grateful to the following for 
permission to reprint their list of studies, especially those published before 1990 
which could not be independently accessed and verified: Brent Rooney, M.Sc., 
Priscilla Coleman, Ph.D., & WECARE EXPERTS, http://www.wecare 
experts.org/sites/default/files/articles/biblioraphy%20of%20Peer%20Reviewed%2
0Studies%20on%20Psychology%20of%20Abortion.pdf (cataloging studies on 
abortion and adverse mental health outcomes); American Association of Pro-Life 
Obstetricians & Gynecologists (AAPLOG), www.aaplog.org; Dr. Angela 
Lanfranchi & Breast Cancer Prevention Institute (BCPI), http://bcp 
institute.org/FactSheets/BCPI-FactSheet-Epidemiol-studies.pdf (listing studies 
on abortion and breast cancer). A partial list of studies can also be found in 
Calhoun, Shadigian & Rooney, Cost Consequences of Induced Abortion as an 
Attributable Risk for Preterm Birth and Impact on Informed Consent, 52 J. 
REPRO. MED. 929 (2007) (listing 59 other studies going back to the 1960s) and 
John M. Thorp Jr., Public Health Impact of Legal Termination of Pregnancy in 
the US: 40 Years Later, SCIENTIFICA, Dec. 2012, at 5, available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.6064/2012/980812. My thanks to Cara Regan, Thomas Short, 
Kyle Dolinsky, and the staff of the Washington and Lee Law Review for their 
meticulous and conscientious work on this article. Any mistakes that remain, of 
course, are mine. 
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I. Introduction 
The Supreme Court’s abortion decisions in Roe v. Wade1 and 
Doe v. Bolton2 have been subjected to extensive criticism over the 
past forty years.3 Scholars have criticized the Court’s mistreatment 
of: common law history,4 American legal history,5 the abortion 
                                                                                                     
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
 2. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).  
 3. See generally Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, Restoring Self-
Government on Abortion: A Federalism Amendment, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301, 
306–20 (2006) (collecting sources); Dennis J. Horan et al., Two Ships Passing in 
the Night: An Interpretavist Review of the White-Stevens Colloquy on Roe v. 
Wade, 6 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 229, 230 n.8 (1987) (collecting sources). 
 4. See generally JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OF 
ABORTION HISTORY 135 (2006) (“The common law, in its early centuries, treated 
abortion as a crime in principle because it involved the killing of an unborn 
child—a tradition that continued with elaboration, but without interruption, 
until Roe changed it.”); Gregory J. Roden, Roe v. Wade and the Common Law: 
Denying the Blessings of Liberty to Our Posterity, 35 UWLA L. REV. 212, 220–39 
(2003) (“The earliest compilations of English law reflect the fact that abortion 
was regarded as homicide.”); Mark S. Scott, Quickening in the Common Law: 
The Legal Precedent Roe Attempted and Failed to Use, 1 MICH. L. & POL. REV. 
199, 200 (1996) (tracing “the intellectual development which gave rise to the 
English common law view that quickening was the point in gestation at which 
the unborn child reached a legally-protectable stage,” and following “the judicial 
and statutory use of quickening through its heyday and into the era of modern 
embryology”); Shelley Gavigan, The Criminal Sanction as It Relates to Human 
Reproduction: The Genesis of the Statutory Prohibition of Abortion, 5 J. LEGAL 
HIST. 20, 21–22 (1984) (discussing the position of the criminal law with respect 
to abortions procured before quickening); Robert A. Destro, Abortion and the 
Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250, 
1267 (1975) (reviewing the common law history of criminal sanctions against 
abortion and “examining the conclusions the Court drew from its historical 
excursus”); Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on 
Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807, 813 (1973) (stating that the Court’s 
“fundamental error” in Roe, “refusing to decide the basic factual issue of 
prenatal humanbeingness,” “may have been caused by the Court’s 
misapprehension of the common law of abortion and the motivation behind early 
American anti-abortion statutes”). 
 5. See STEPHEN KRASON, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 91 (1984) (“The Court tried to cut out any historical basis for its 
critics to object to its holding. . . . Believing it adequately demonstrated a liberty 
of abortion at common law, it now established the basis for that liberty within 
the unique confines of the written Constitution . . . .”); John Keown, Back to the 
Future of Abortion Law: Roe’s Rejection of America’s History and Traditions, 22 
ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 3 (2006) (questioning Justice Blackmun’s conclusion “that a 
constitutional right to abortion was consistent with [the history of abortion in 
 
830 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 827 (2014) 
statutes of the nineteenth century,6 the use of sociological evidence 
that was not part of any record,7 the Hippocratic Oath,8 existing 
prenatal injury, wrongful death and fetal homicide law,9 existing 
state and federal court decisions on a right to abortion,10 
                                                                                                     
Anglo-American law]” and the historians’ claim “that Roe was consistent with 
the nation’s history and traditions”). 
 6. See Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight 
from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 103 (1993) 
(“The Court’s examination of the history of abortion regulation was seriously 
flawed and failed to take into account the state of medical technology in which 
the law of abortion evolved.”); James S. Witherspoon, Reexamining Roe: 
Nineteenth-Century Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 29, 32–34 (1985) (providing a discussion of nineteenth century 
criminal abortion statutes and their displacement of the common law). 
 7. See Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and 
Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 36–37 (1978) (providing that “no evidence 
was offered at the hearing before the three-judge court” in Roe and that the 
Court’s conclusion in Roe “rested entirely on materials not of record in the trial 
court”). 
 8. See Martin Arbagi, Roe and the Hippocratic Oath, in ABORTION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH THE COURTS 159, 163 (1987) 
(discussing how Justice Blackmun did not “cite any primary sources” in the 
section of Roe “dealing specifically with the Hippocratic oath”). 
 9. See Gregory J. Roden, Prenatal Tort Law and the Personhood of the 
Unborn Child: A Separate Legal Existence, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 207, 208 
(2003) (examining “the state of prenatal tort and wrongful death law at the time 
the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade”); David Kader, The Law of Tortious 
Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 MO. L. REV. 639, 640 (1980) (“The 
ideological history of prenatal injury law, and the more recent development of 
prenatal death law has consistently moved toward the affirmation of the unborn 
as a ‘person’ in the law, with a parallel history evidenced in criminal abortion 
legislation.”); William J. Maledon, Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The 
Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 349, 358 (1971) 
(“Where the child is born alive and then subsequently dies as a result of injuries 
received prior to birth, the courts which have considered the question are almost 
unanimous in allowing the child’s estate to bring an action for wrongful death.”). 
“Although the cause of action for wrongful death is purely statutory, the child 
born alive has always been considered a ‘person’ regardless of how short a time 
he actually survives.” Id. For the state of legal protection before Roe see Case 
Comment, The Role of the Law of Homicide in Fetal Destruction, 56 IOWA L. REV. 
658, 659 n.8 (1971) (citing ten states with statutes “defining feticide as a 
homicide”). 
 10. See Richard Gregory Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of Pre-Roe 
Case Law, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1727 (1979) (discussing various state and 
federal court decisions on a right to abortion). 
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precedent,11 and the unborn child’s status as a human being or 
person in the law.12 Others have criticized the workability of the 
Court’s doctrine13 and its impact on women.14 Recently, Professor 
                                                                                                     
 11. See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS 
ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 367 (1998) 
(discussing how the Court “failed in its responsibility to justify its ruling or even 
clarify the source of its authority”).  
As a precedent-follower, Roe simply string cites a series of privacy 
cases involving marriage, procreation, contraception, bedroom 
reading, education, and other assorted topics, and then abruptly 
announces with no doctrinal analysis that this privacy right is 
“broad enough to encompass” abortion. Ipse dixit.  But as the 
Court itself admits a few pages later, the existence of the living 
fetus makes the case at hand “inherently different”—the italics 
here are mine—from every single one of these earlier-invoked 
cases. 
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778 (1999) (citations 
omitted).  
 12. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Plausibility of Personhood, 74 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 13, 14 (2013) (considering “the constitutional question of the legal 
personhood status of living human fetuses in utero”). 
 13. See, e.g., CLARKE D. FORSYTHE, ABUSE OF DISCRETION: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF ROE V. WADE 150–52 (2013) [hereinafter ABUSE OF DISCRETION] (discussing 
the various problems with the Doe “health” definition, which expanded the 
abortion “right” beyond viability); Mary Ann Glendon, From Culture Wars to 
Building a Culture of Life, in THE COST OF “CHOICE”: WOMEN EVALUATE THE 
IMPACT OF ABORTION 3, 5 (Erika Bachiochi ed., 2004) (“Doe’s broad definition of 
‘health’ spelled the doom of statutes designed to prevent the abortion late in 
pregnancy of children capable of surviving outside the mother’s body unless the 
mother’s health was in danger.”); Clarke D. Forsythe & Bradley N. Kehr, A 
Road Map Through the Supreme Court’s Back Alley, 57 VILL. L. REV. 45, 46 
(2012) (“The main obstacle to effective health and safety regulations is not a 
lack of majority support, but rather the Supreme Court’s abortion doctrine, 
which was misguided in its inception and has been contradictory in its 
application.”); James Bopp, Jr., & Richard E. Coleson, The Right to Abortion: 
Anomalous, Absolute, and Ripe for Reversal, 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 181, 183 (1989) 
(“The special treatment for the abortion right violates the principles underlying 
the rule of law, the foundation stone of our constitutional system.”). See 
generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE 
SEVENTIES (1979) (discussing twenty inquiries that explore the history and 
nature of the abortion right). 
 14. See Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of 
Roe v. Wade: Why Abortion Should Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 85, 109 (2005) (“The medical and sociological data now make plain that 
induced abortion has undermined the health of women in myriad ways: 
physically, psychologically, medically, and relationally.”); Glendon, supra note 
13, at 10 (“Where abortion is concerned, medical and psychological consequences 
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Randy Beck has published several articles that focus on the 
arbitrary nature of the viability rule that the Court has never 
adequately justified,15 a focus shared by others before him.16 
Professor Stephen Gilles has analyzed how the Court has never 
justified or explained its life-or-health exception after 
viability.17 Others have criticized the search for a new 
rationale for the Court’s abortion doctrine, whether it is found 
in the Equal Protection Clause18 or the Nineteenth 
Amendment.19  
                                                                                                     
abound.”); Helen M. Alvare, Gonzales v. Carhart: Bringing Abortion Law Back 
into the Family Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409, 412 (2008) (arguing that 
abortion law should be harmonized with the rest of family law).  
 15. See Randy Beck, The Essential Holding of Casey: Rethinking Viability, 
75 UMKC L. REV. 713, 725 (2007) (considering and rejecting “three possible 
explanations for the viability standard”). Beck argues that “[t]he inadequacy of 
these three rationales shows that the Court has failed to present a principled 
defense of viability as the controlling line.” Id.; see also Randy Beck, Gonzales, 
Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249, 252 (2009) (“Under the 
reasoning of Casey, if the Court cannot offer a principled constitutional rationale 
for requiring the ability to survive ex utero as a condition for state protection, 
then the Court should abandon the viability rule as an illegitimate and 
arbitrary line, inappropriate for judicial imposition.”); Randy Beck, Self-
Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester Framework, 51 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 505, 520 (2011) (providing a discussion of the issue of the duration 
of abortion rights from a cover memorandum that accompanied Justice 
Blackmun’s second draft of Roe); Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun 
to the Conference, Re: No. 70-18—Roe v. Wade (Nov. 21, 1972) (quoting Justice 
Blackmun as saying “[y]ou will observe that I have concluded that the end of the 
first trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other selected point, 
such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary”) (on file at the Library of 
Congress, in the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Box 151, 
Folder 6); Randy Beck, State Interests and the Duration of Abortion Rights, 44 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 31, 38 (2013) (“While the Court alluded to ‘logical and 
biological justifications’ for ‘State regulation protective of fetal life after 
viability,’ it nowhere explained those justifications or why they took on added 
weight at the point when the fetus crossed the viability threshold.”). 
 16. See Mark Tushnet, Two Notes on the Jurisprudence of Privacy, 8 
CONST. COMMENT. 75, 80 (1991) (stating that the coherence of the distinction 
between viability and non-viability is rarely examined and that the concept of 
viability is problematic); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment 
on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924–25 (1973) (discussing the inadequacy of 
the viability rule). 
 17. See Stephen G. Gilles, Roe’s Life-or-Health Exception: Self-Defense or 
Relative-Safety?, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 525, 527 (2010) (“As formulated in Roe, 
the exception turns out to be deeply ambiguous in rationale and scope.”). 
 18. See Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection 
 
THE MEDICAL ASSUMPTION 833 
II. The Medical Premise of Roe v. Wade 
Too little attention, however, has been paid over the past 
forty years to the complete lack of a factual record in Roe v. Wade 
and Doe v. Bolton, and to the Court’s fundamental medical 
assumption that drove the outcome.20 The decision and opinions 
were driven by the medical claim that “abortion was safer than 
childbirth,” which was raised for the first time in the briefs in the 
Supreme Court and without any lower court record.21 That 
assumption was at the very heart of the deliberations and 
decisions in the abortions cases. The Court in City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health22 specifically referred to it 
                                                                                                     
Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 897 (2011) (“In 
applying equal protection reasoning to questions of abortion law, the Court 
could, in effect, take a step that Congress, by declining to pass the Freedom of 
Choice Act, has thus far refused: invalidate laws regulating abortion throughout 
the fifty states.”); Mary Catherine Wilcox, Why the Equal Protection Clause 
Cannot “Fix” Abortion Law, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 307, 320–21 (2008) 
(“[C]lassification on the basis of pregnancy is not a classification on the basis of 
gender, and thus the Equal Protection Clause cannot be used to strike down 
abortion statutes on the basis that they discriminate against women as a 
class.”); Kristina M. Mentone, When Equal Protection Fails: How the Equal 
Protection Justification for Abortion Undercuts the Struggle for Equality in the 
Workplace, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2657, 2685 (2002) (arguing “that the equal 
protection argument for abortion perpetuates stereotypical views of women and 
makes true gender equality more difficult to achieve”). 
 19. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but 
the Text, So Help Me God: Un-Writing Amar’s Unwritten Constitution, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (reviewing Akhil Reed Amar’s America’s 
Unwritten Constitution).  
 20. But see David C. Reardon et al., Deaths Associated with Abortion 
Compared to Childbirth—A Review of New and Old Data and the Medical and 
Legal Implications, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 281 (2004) (“Thirty 
years later, the best available evidence now contradicts the ‘established medical 
fact’ relied upon in Roe.”); Robert A. Destro, Abortion and the Constitution: The 
Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250, 1296–1303 (1975) 
(criticizing medical data that the Court relied upon). 
 21. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973) (“Appellants and various 
amici refer to medical data indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, that is, 
prior to the end of the first trimester, although not without its risk, is now 
relatively safe.”).  
 22. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).  
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as “Roe’s factual assumption”23 and said that “the State retains 
an interest in ensuring the validity” of the assumption.24  
The medical premise directly and profoundly shaped 
virtually every major aspect of Roe and Doe, including the 
creation of the trimester system25 and the prohibition of health 
and safety regulations in the first trimester.26 Because of this 
medical assumption, the Justices extended the right to abortion 
throughout pregnancy.27 It was key to the Court’s historical 
rationale for a “right” to abortion.28 Because of this notion, the 
Justices gave abortion providers complete discretion to manage 
any issues of health and safety,29 and they prohibited public-
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 430 n.12.  
 24. Id.  
 25. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (providing that the state’s interest in 
regulating abortion becomes “compelling” “at approximately the end of the first 
trimester”). 
 26. Id. 
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the 
health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in light of present 
medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. 
This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred to 
above at 149, that until the end of the first trimester mortality in 
abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. 
 27. See id. at 163–64 (“If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after 
viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period [after 
viability], except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
mother.”). 
 28. See id. at 148–49 & n.44 (“Mortality rates for women undergoing early 
[legal] abortions . . . appear to be as low as . . . rates for normal childbirth.  
Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from an 
inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for 
her to forgo it, has largely disappeared.”); Id. at 151 (“Because medical advances 
have lessened this concern, at least with respect to abortion in early pregnancy, 
they argue that with respect to such abortions the laws can no longer be 
justified by any state interest.  There is some scholarly support for this view of 
original purpose.”). 
 29. See id. at 163  
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior 
to this ‘compelling’ point, the attending physician, in consultation 
with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, 
that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be 
terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be 
effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State. 
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health officials from regulating abortion in the first trimester.30 
This medical assumption was the most consequential factual 
assumption of the abortion decisions of 1973, and it has been 
assumed to be true in subsequent abortion decisions by the 
Court.31  
A. The Impact of Roe and Doe 
Of course, what the public knows as “Roe v. Wade” is really 
two cases, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. The companion case of 
Doe v. Bolton has been regularly ignored over the past forty 
years, despite its significant impact on abortion policy in the 
United States. The Court held that Roe and Doe “are to be read 
together.”32 In Roe, the Court held that the states could prohibit 
abortion after fetal viability, “except where it is necessary . . . for 
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”33 Then, in 
Doe, the Justices defined “health” as “all factors—physical, 
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant 
to the well-being of the patient.”34 The “health exception” after 
viability swallowed the supposed prohibition after viability. For 
forty years, the “health exception” after viability has meant 
emotional well-being without limits.35 Though some dispute that 
                                                                                                     
 30. See id. at 164 (“For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first 
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical 
judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.”). 
 31. The medical assumption has influenced the Justices in several cases. 
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 76 (1976) 
(“[T]he mortality rate for normal childbirth exceeds that where saline 
amniocentesis is employed.”); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 429 n.11 (1983) (“The comparison between abortion and 
childbirth mortality rates may be relevant only where the State employs a 
health rationale as a justification for a complete prohibition on abortions in 
certain circumstances.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
929 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (citing comparative mortality 
rates); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923–24 (2000) (citing mortality rates). 
 32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973). 
 33. Id. at 164–65.   
 34. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). 
 35. See id. (“[T]he medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all 
factors . . . relevant to the well-being of the patient.”). 
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the “health” exception is a constitutional requirement,36 federal 
courts have imposed it as a constitutional requirement to 
invalidate abortion laws, including post-viability regulations.37 As 
Laurence Tribe wrote shortly after the decisions, “in [Roe and 
Doe] . . . [the Court] carried that doctrine [of substantive due 
process] to lengths few observers had expected, imposing limits 
on permissible abortion legislation so severe that no abortion law 
in the United States remained valid.”38  
B. The Mistake that Left the Justices with No Record 
Roe and Doe actually began as a procedural mistake that left 
the Justices with no evidentiary record. The Court took the two 
cases in April 1971, when Justices Black and Harlan were still on 
the Court, not to decide the abortion issue but to decide the 
application of Younger v. Harris39 and, to a lesser extent, 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1036, 1037 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Our 
conclusion that the statutory phrase at issue in Doe was not vague because it 
included emotional and psychological considerations in no way supports the 
proposition that, after viability, a mental health exception is required as a 
matter of federal constitutional law.”). 
 37. See Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 
283, 299 (3d Cir. 1984) (“It is clear from the Supreme Court cases that ‘health’ is 
to be broadly defined. As the Court stated in Doe v. Bolton, the factors relating 
to health include those that are ‘physical, emotional, psychological, familial, [as 
well as] the woman’s age.’”), aff’d, Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); see also Michael J. Tierney, Post-Viability 
Abortion Bans and the Limits of the Health Exception, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
465, 470 (2004) (“While there are many places to look for guidance, the Sixth 
Circuit was wrong to look to Vuitch and Doe to establish that a mental health 
exception was constitutionally mandated. Both of these decisions were statutory 
interpretations and not constitutional mandates.”); Brian D. Wassom, 
Comment, The Exception that Swallowed the Rule? Women’s Medical 
Professional Corporation v. Voinovich and the Mental Health Exception to Post-
Viability Abortion Bans, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 799, 800 (1999) (“Federal 
courts, however, have been wary to uphold such laws unless they contain an 
unambiguous health exception—one that, in the view of many courts, must 
allow doctors almost limitless discretion to determine what ‘health’ means in 
any given context.”). 
 38. ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 1. 
 39. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  
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Dombrowski v. Pfister40 to the procedural aspects of Roe and 
Doe.41 
Then, in September 1971, Justices Black and Harlan 
abruptly retired due to ill health.42 That flipped the balance of the 
Court, and a temporary majority of four Justices—Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall—resolved or disregarded the 
Younger issue and decided to use the two cases to declare a right 
to abortion before the Black and Harlan vacancies could be 
filled.43 That is how the Justices ended up with two cases that 
had no trial or any evidentiary record on abortion or its 
implications, disregarding a long line of cases holding that the 
Court will not decide constitutional questions without an 
adequate record.44 
                                                                                                     
 40. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 41. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 19 (“Younger intersected 
with the abortion cases filed in federal court against state laws from 1969 to 
1972 because a doctor who was prosecuted for abortion in state court might file 
a case in federal court to block the state prosecution—the kind of scenario with 
which Younger was concerned.”).  
 42. See id. at 37 (“One of the decisive moments came in September 1971, 
about three months before the first oral arguments, when Justices Black and 
Harlan abruptly retired, within a week of each other, due to poor health.”). 
 43. See id. at 43. (“The Black and Harlan vacancies gave the four Justices 
who favored striking down the abortion laws—Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and 
Stewart—a great incentive to decide Roe and Doe without the votes of Powell 
and Rehnquist.”).  
 44. See, e.g., Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1991) (“We possess no 
factual record of an actual or imminent application of [the statute] sufficient to 
present the constitutional issues in ‘clean-cut and concrete form.’” (citations 
omitted)); Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976) (“We have often 
declined to decide important questions regarding ‘the scope and 
constitutionality of legislation’ in the absence of ‘an adequate and full-bodied 
record.’” (citations omitted)); Pub. Affairs Assocs. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 113 
(1962) (per curiam) (“Adjudication of such problems, certainly by way of resort 
to a discretionary declaratory judgment, should rest on an adequate and full-
bodied record. The record before us is woefully lacking in these requirements.”); 
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (“Courts deal with cases 
upon the basis of the facts disclosed, never with nonexistent and assumed 
circumstances.”); City of Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U.S. 164, 171–72 
(1927) (“Before any of the questions suggested, which are both novel and of far 
reaching importance, are passed upon by this Court, the facts essential to their 
decision should be definitely found by the lower courts upon adequate 
evidence.”). 
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Justice Blackmun told this story to at least two people, and it 
is confirmed by the briefs, the Justices’ papers, and the oral 
arguments. Justice Blackmun wrote to Chief Justice Rehnquist in 
1987:  
I remember that the old Chief [Warren Burger] appointed a 
screening committee, chaired by Potter [Stewart], to select 
those cases that could (it was assumed) be adequately heard 
by a Court of seven. I was on that little committee. We did not 
do a good job. Potter pressed for Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton 
to be heard and did so in the misapprehension that they 
involved nothing more than an application of Younger v. 
Harris. How wrong we were.45  
With no evidentiary record in either Roe or Doe, the Justices were 
left with a large vacuum and the temptation to rely upon their 
personal experiences, prejudices, and hunches in deciding the 
abortion cases. And, in that evidentiary vacuum, the Justices 
were susceptible to untested theories of law, history, and 
medicine.46  
C. The Source of the Medical Mantra 
One of those untested theories was the medical notion that 
“abortion was safer than childbirth.” Up through the 1950s, 
neither leading abortion advocates nor Planned Parenthood 
claimed that “abortion was safer than childbirth.”47  
                                                                                                     
 45. Letter from Justice Blackmun, U.S. Supreme Court, to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist (July 16, 1987) (on file at the Library of Congress, Harry A. 
Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 3, and Box 1407, Folder 13); see also ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 18 (quoting Justice Blackmun’s July 20 letter 
to Justice Rehnquist).  
 46. Federal Judge Richard Posner recently suggested that he erred in 
Crawford v. Marion County when he upheld a state voter identification law 
despite the insufficiency of the record. Judge Posner said: “I think we did not 
have enough information. And of course it illustrates the basic problem that I 
emphasize in [my new] book. We judges and lawyers, we don’t know enough 
about the subject matters that we regulate, right?” Josh Gerstein, Judge: My 
Voter ID Ruling Was Wrong, JOSH GERSTEIN BLOG (Oct. 11, 2013, 6:04 PM), 
http://politi.co/165Y0qQ (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 47. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 159 (discussing where “the 
mantra” came from).  
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The source of the claim is apparently an April 1961 report by 
Christopher Tietze in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA).48 Thereafter, attorneys for abortion 
advocates made the claim in numerous cases in the 1960s in an 
attempt to influence the courts to legalize abortion.49 Eventually, 
Tietze’s paper made its way into court decisions. The California 
Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in People v. Belous,50 the first 
state court decision to invalidate a state abortion law, was the 
first court to make the claim.51 That decision actually cited three 
of the medical sources that the Supreme Court later cited in Roe 
and Doe.52 By the time the Court considered Roe and Doe, the 
claim that “abortion is safer than childbirth” was so frequently 
repeated that it had become a mantra.  
                                                                                                     
 48. See Christopher Tietze, Legal Abortion in Eastern Europe, 175 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 1149, 1149 (1961) (“These low [abortion] death rates compare 
favorably with mortality from all complications of pregnancy, childbirth, and the 
puerperium . . . .”).  
 49. See, e.g., Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 994 n.24 (D. Kan. 1972) 
(stating that “Plaintiffs’ evidence indicates that the abortion procedure is among 
the safest of surgical procedures,” citing, without reference, “a survey” that 
revealed that abortion “is 2.7 times safer than childbirth”); Babbitz v. McCann, 
310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (citing the Belous decision, not any 
medical study); People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 200–01 n.7 (Cal. 1969) (stating 
“[i]t is now safer for a woman to have a hospital therapeutic abortion during the 
first trimester than to bear a child” (citing Tietze, supra note 48, at 1152)); Vera 
Kolblova, Legal Abortion in Czechoslovakia, 196 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 371 (1966); K. 
Mehland, Combating Illegal Abortion in the Socialist Countries of Europe, 13 
WORLD MED. J. 84 (1966). 
 50. 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969). 
 51. See id. at 206 (invalidating section 274 of the California Penal Code, 
which made it a crime to perform an abortion unless it was necessary to 
preserve the woman’s life); Abortion, 64 NW. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 393, 394 
(1973) (providing that People v. Belous “was the first decision to declare a 
criminal abortion statute unconstitutional”).  
 52. Compare Belous, 458 P.2d at 201 n.7 (citing Tietze, supra note 48, at 
1152; Kolblova, supra note 49; Mehland, supra note 49), with Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 149 n.44 (1973) (citing Tietze, supra note 48, at 1152), and Doe v. 
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 216 n.5 (1973) (citing Tietze, supra note 48, at 1152; 
Kolblova, supra note 49; Mehland, supra note 49). 
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D. No Factual Record in the Abortion Cases 
Both Roe and Doe were decided without trials or evidentiary 
records.53 The factual records consisted merely of a complaint, an 
affidavit, and motions to dismiss that addressed legal, not 
factual, issues. In two hour-long hearings, the judges addressed 
procedural and jurisdictional issues more than they addressed 
substantive questions.54 And then a direct appeal to the Supreme 
Court was made without any intermediate appellate review.55 
Realizing that Doe’s lack of any evidentiary record was a 
problem,56 Sarah Weddington’s co-counsel in the Supreme Court, 
Roy Lucas, stressed the need to fill that vacuum at a strategy 
meeting of attorneys in Manhattan in July 1971, as historian 
David Garrow recounts.57 Lucas sought to rectify the lack of a 
factual medical record by filing “a supplementary appendix of 
more than four dozen prior court rulings and medical journal 
papers that all-told came to an imposing 477 pages, far larger 
than the brief itself,” as Garrow has described it.58 He filled the 
“supplemental appendix” with sixty articles, fifteen of which dealt 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (holding 
“that the motions for summary judgment of the plaintiff Roe and plaintiff-
intervenor Hallford should be granted as to their request for declaratory 
judgment” and finding “the Texas Abortion Laws unconstitutional for vagueness 
and overbreadth”); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (N.D. Ga. 1970) 
(providing that “Plaintiffs seek an order declaring Georgia’s Abortion Statute 
unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement on various grounds”). 
 54. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 160 (discussing the lack of 
a factual record in Roe and Doe).  
 55. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973) (“Appellants directly 
appealed to this Court on the injunctive rulings, and appellee cross-appealed 
from the District Court’s grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford.”); see 
also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 179 (1973) (“The appellants, claiming 
entitlement to broader relief, directly appealed to this Court.”). 
 56. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 493 (1994) (providing that Lucas “emphasized 
how regrettable it was that Doe’s crucial but as yet unsuccessful challenge to the 
Georgia statute’s hospitalization requirement was going forward without any 
extensive trial court evidentiary record having been developed”). 
 57. See id. (“Data on New York’s now almost one-year-old experience with 
nonhospital procedures might be a potentially persuasive substitute if it was 
featured prominently enough in the Doe briefs, Lucas advised.”). 
 58. Id. at 500. 
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with “medical” and “sociological” issues.59 Nine articles addressed 
medicine. But none of these nine articles claimed that abortion 
was safer than childbirth.60 And none of these was among those 
that the Court eventually cited.61 Many of the articles were not 
peer-reviewed;62 some were not even published;63 and none was 
part of the record.64 So, the mantra was first presented in the 
briefs filed in the Supreme Court in the summer of 1971 before 
the first oral arguments on December 13, 1971. The truth of the 
claim that “abortion was safer than childbirth” was directly 
                                                                                                     
 59. See id. at 500–01 (“Lucas included former Justice Tom Clark’s law 
review essay as well as medical studies by supportive doctors such as Bob Hall 
and Christopher Tietze . . . .”). 
 60. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 160 (discussing medical 
articles and essays that Roy Lucas included in the supplemental appendix in 
Doe).   
 61. The nine medical articles were: Robert E. Hall, Abortion in American 
Hospitals, 57 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1933 (1967); Robert E. Hall, Therapeutic 
Abortion, Sterilization, and Contraception, 91 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
531 (1965); Alan Margolis et al., Therapeutic Abortion Follow-Up Study, 110 AM. 
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 243 (1971); George Walter, Psychologic and 
Emotional Consequences of Elective Abortion, 36 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 482 
(1970); Christopher Tietze, Mortality with Contraception and Induced Abortion, 
45 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 6 (1969); Alan Margolis & Edmund Overstreet, Legal 
Abortion Without Hospitalization, 36 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 479 (1970); H. 
Harvey & B. Pyle, On the Healthiness of Four Thousand Abortions in a Free-
Standing Clinic (unpublished manuscript); Sadja Goldsmith & Alan Margolis, 
Aspiration Abortion Without Cervical Dilation, 9 J. REPROD. MED. 237 (1972); A. 
Jefferson Penfield, Abortion Under Paracervical Block, 71 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 1185 
(1971). None of these were among the seven cited by the Court, which were: 
Abortion Mortality, 20 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 208 (1971); 
Christopher Tietze, Mortality with Contraception and Induced Abortion, 45 
STUD. FAM. PLAN. 6 (1969); Christopher Tietze, Legal Abortion in Eastern 
Europe, 175 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1149 (1961); Vera Kolblova, Legal Abortion in 
Czechoslovakia, 196 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 371 (1966); K. Mehland, Combating 
Illegal Abortion in the Socialist Countries of Europe, 13 WORLD MED. J. 84 
(1966); Malcom Potts, Postconceptive Control of Fertility, 8 INT’L J. OF G. & O. 
957 (1970); Christopher Tietze, United States: Therapeutic Abortions, 1963 to 
1968, 59 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 5 (1970). 
 62. Tietze, supra note 48; See Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 52 (“It is 
not an analysis of data, must less a peer-reviewed study, but a report on 
conference papers addressing statistics from the 1940s and 1950s from Eastern 
European countries.”). 
 63. Harvey & Pyle, supra note 61.  
 64. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 160 (discussing the lack of 
record). 
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disputed at oral argument, and it was repeatedly pointed out that 
neither Roe nor Doe had any record.65  
The mantra was based on abortion mortality numbers from 
Soviet Bloc countries.66 But there were no reliable data from 
these countries, and no reliable data that these rates were 
comparable or that they showed that “abortion was safer than 
childbirth.” No existing text book on obstetrics and gynecology 
claimed that “abortion was safer than childbirth.”67 Nevertheless, 
Justices Blackmun and Douglas ended up citing seven medical 
references between them to support the mantra in Roe and Doe.68 
All except one of the seven sources relied on 1950s statistics from 
Soviet Bloc countries; but even those were not peer-reviewed 
studies, just raw numbers.69 They cited, for example, Tietze’s 
1961 JAMA article, but this was merely a report of an 
international conference on abortion from May 1960 and 
conversations by the author, Christopher Tietze, with a “Dr. 
Herschler” about Hungarian data.70 Another is merely a letter to 
the editor.71 Several of the articles do not even claim to compare 
                                                                                                     
 65. Id.; see also id. at 161 (“The Justices never questioned the truthfulness 
of the mantra or of the proffered medical data, though it was disputed by the 
attorneys for Texas and Georgia.”). 
 66. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 n.44 (1973) (citing Tietze, supra 
note 61 (Japan, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and Tietze, supra note 48, at 1152 
(Eastern Europe)); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 216 n.5 (1973) (citing Kolblova, 
supra note 49; Mehland, supra note 49). See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 
13, at 163–70, for a critical analysis of these articles. 
 67. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 170 n.60. (“But no 
textbooks are cited in Roe to support the mantra because the existing obstetrical 
textbooks published before 1972 never made the claim . . . .”).  
 68. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 149 n.44 (citing medical articles in majority 
opinion of Justice Blackmun); Doe, 410 U.S. at 216 n.5 (citing medical articles in 
concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).  
 69. That article was Malcom Potts, Postconceptive Control of Fertility, 8 
INT’L J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 957 (1970). This article “contains no data 
and no supporting studies,” and “[v]irtually all assertions on data are 
undocumented and have no citations whatsoever.” Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 
13, at 53. 
 70. Tietze, supra note 48. 
 71. Kolblova, supra note 49. Vera Kolblova’s “‘article’ is really a six-
paragraph letter to the editor” in which she “comments on Czech abortion law 
since 1957.” Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 53. 
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childbirth mortality and abortion mortality.72 Finally, there were 
data from New York City, derived from ten months of New York 
State’s legalization of abortion after July 1970.73 But this was 
hotly disputed for one key reason: 55.5% of the abortions in those 
months were performed on out-of-state residents who were lost to 
follow-up, making it impossible to monitor their condition.74 A 
one-page clerk’s memo in Justice Blackmun’s papers 
acknowledged this criticism, concluding that it was 
“devastating.”75 But Justice Blackmun merely corrected the 
clerk’s grammar, as he was known to do,76 and proceeded to cite 
the New York numbers in his final Roe opinion.77 The mantra—
and the data from the Soviet Bloc countries—were challenged as 
unreliable by the attorneys for Texas and Georgia in their briefs 
and at the oral arguments in December 1971, and the 
rearguments in October 1972.78 
                                                                                                     
 72. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 n.44 (1973) (citing Potts, supra note 
69, at 967; Christopher Tietze, United States: Therapeutic Abortions, 1963 to 
1968, 59 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 5, 7 (1970)); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 216 n.5 
(1973) (citing Kloblova, supra note 66; Mehland, supra note 66). 
 73. Abortion Mortality, 20 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 208, 208 
(1971). 
 74. See Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 53 (discussing the arguments 
that critics made regarding “a June 1971 report on data from New York City 
supposedly documenting the city’s experience since New York legalized abortion 
on July 1, 1970”). 
 75. Memorandum from Law Clerk to Justice Blackmun (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 76. See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY 
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 107 (2005) (“And he himself reviewed his 
clerks’ work, not only correcting their spelling and punctuation but also 
checking the accuracy of the citations in the opinions they drafted for him. No 
other justice engaged in this level of detailed review.”). 
 77. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 n.44 (1973) (citing Abortion 
Mortality, 20 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 208, 209 (1971)). 
 78. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 170–71 (discussing how the 
contrary data was ignored by the Court). 
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E. Impact of the Medical Mantra 
Unfortunately, the adoption of the medical mantra by the 
Court in Roe that “abortion was safer than childbirth” has had at 
least four negative results. 
1. The Public Health Vacuum 
From the 1960s to the 1980s, Henry J. Friendly was 
considered one of the greatest federal judges to never sit on the 
U.S. Supreme Court.79 Friendly served on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals in Manhattan from 1959 until his death in March 1986.80 
Judge Richard Posner has written that “Friendly’s opinions and 
academic writings, in field after field, proposed revisions and 
clarifications of doctrines that time after time the Supreme Court 
gratefully adopted.”81 Both Justices William Brennan and John 
Paul Stevens considered Friendly one of the greatest federal 
judges.82 So, it was significant that Friendly was assigned in 1969 
to hear a federal court challenge to the New York State abortion 
law,83 one of twenty plus cases filed in the federal courts between 
1969 and 1972 to challenge state abortion laws.84 Friendly, who 
favored the legalization of abortion by the state legislature, 
                                                                                                     
 79. See DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA 
356 (2012) (“Many, including Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia, 
have coupled Friendly with Hand as the two greatest lower-court federal judges 
who never sat on the Supreme Court.”). 
 80. See A. Raymond Randolph, Administrative Law and the Legacy of 
Henry J. Friendly, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) (providing a timeline of Henry 
Friendly’s education and career). 
 81. Judge Richard A. Posner, Foreword to DAVID M. DORSEN, HENRY 
FRIENDLY: GREATEST JUDGE OF HIS ERA, at xii (2012). 
 82. See DORSEN, supra note 79, at 356 (discussing “the many extravagant, 
but warranted, compliments paid to Friendly”).  
 83. See Hall v. Lefkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030, 1031 (1969) (challenging 
“New York State’s abortion laws on various grounds of constitutional infirmity”). 
 84. See A. Raymond Randolph, Circuit Judge, United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Address at the Barbara K. Olson 
Memorial Lecture: Before Roe v. Wade: Judge Friendly’s Draft Abortion Opinion 
(Nov. 11, 2005), in 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1035, 1036 (2006) (discussing how 
Judge Friendly was one of the judges assigned to a three-judge district court to 
hear the case brought by Roy Lucas in Hall v. Lefkowitz).  
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drafted an opinion in April and May 1970, which rejected the 
extension of Griswold v. Connecticut85 to abortion.86 He would 
have upheld the constitutionality of the New York State abortion 
law.87 
But Friendly’s draft opinion never saw the light of day.88 
When New York State legalized abortion in May 1970, the case 
was dismissed as moot, and Friendly’s opinion was left in his 
personal papers for thirty-six years, apparently open to the public 
but little noticed until 2006.89 Friendly’s draft opinion stated:  
[T]he decision what to do about abortion is for the elected 
representatives of the people, not for three, or even nine, 
appointed judges . . . . The legislature can make choices among 
[various abortion policies], observe the results, and act again 
as observation may dictate. Experience in one state may 
benefit others . . . . In contrast a court can only strike down a 
law, leaving a vacuum in its place.90 
That’s exactly what Roe v. Wade did. 
The Justices’ medical assumption was directly responsible for 
the Justices’ prohibition of health and safety regulations in the 
first trimester, when ninety percent of abortions are done.91 After 
Roe and Doe, the Justices proceeded between 1974 and 1980 to 
affirm invalidation or deny certiorari in three cases with clinic 
regulations.92 The implications have been serious, as recent 
incidents demonstrate: 
                                                                                                     
 85. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 86. See Randolph, supra note 84, at 1038 (“Judge Friendly viewed abortion 
as another matter entirely, having nothing to do with privacy of the Griswold 
variety.”). 
 87. See id. at 1040 (“‘For we cannot say the New York legislature lacked a 
rational basis for considering that abortion causes such harm.’”). 
 88. See id. at 1035 (noting that no one knows “Judge Friendly wrote an 
opinion in the first abortion-rights case ever filed in federal court” because that 
opinion was never published). 
 89. See id. at 1037 (stating that the Hall v. Lefkowitz case was dismissed 
and no opinion was issued, after the New York legislature amended the statute 
to allow abortion on demand during the first twenty-four weeks of pregnancy).  
 90. Id. at 1040–41. 
 91. Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 51.  
 92. See Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chi. Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 
1143 (7th Cir. 1974) (invalidating “regulations which describe in substantial 
detail conditions, equipment, and procedures that medical facilities offering 
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• Investigative officials in February 2010 found “deplorable 
and unsanitary” conditions and numerous health and 
safety violations in the Philadelphia abortion clinic of Dr. 
Kermit Gosnell. The Philadelphia District Attorney 
charged Gosnell with murder in the death of an abortion 
patient. He was tried in March 2013, and convicted on 
May 13, 2013.93  
• After Alexandra Nunez died in January 2010 from a 
botched abortion by Dr. Robert Hosty at his A-1 Women’s 
Center in Queens, New York, the State of New York 
finally revoked his license two years later.94 
• In July 2011, a jury in Orlando, Florida awarded $36.7 
million in damages against abortion provider Dr. James 
Pendergraft for profound injuries to a child who survived a 
late-term abortion.95  
                                                                                                     
abortions must comply with, without regard to the trimester of pregnancy 
involved”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); Sendak v. Arnold, 429 U.S. 968 
(1976), aff’d 416 F. Supp. 22, 22–23 (S.D. Ind.) (declaring unconstitutional the 
part of the Indiana abortion statute that requires all abortions, including those 
in the first trimester of pregnancy, to be performed “in a hospital or a licensed 
health facility”); Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 696 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (holding 
that Florida’s “approved facility” requirements “are constitutionally invalid 
because they make no distinction between the first trimester of pregnancy . . . 
and the latter trimesters where the State may impose regulations reasonably 
related to the preservation and protection of maternal health”), appeal 
dismissed, 417 U.S. 279 (1974), and affirming denial of injunction sub nom. Poe 
v. Gerstein, 417 U.S. 281 (1974). 
 93. Jon Hurdle, Doctor Starts His Life Term in Grisly Abortion Clinic Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/us/kermit-
gosnell-abortion-doctor-gets-life-term.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See also Forsythe & Kehr, supra 
note 13, at 59, for an analysis of what created the context for Kermit Gosnell’s 
practices. 
 94. Michael J. Feeney et al., Queens Clinic A1 Medicine Probed After 
Alexandra Nunez is Fatally Injured While Undergoing Abortion, 
NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/queens-
clinic-a1-medicine-probed-alexandra-nunez-fatally-injured-undergoing-abortion-
article-1.460728  (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 95. Anthony Colarossi, Judge Denies Orlando-Area Abortion Doctor New 
Trial in $36 Million Malpractice Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 15, 2011), 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-08-15/news/os-abortion-doctor-ruling-
20110815_1_abortion-doctor-orlando-women-s-center-malpractice-case (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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• In the summer of 2011, the Chicago Tribune found six 
deaths and 4,000 injuries in Illinois abortion clinics that 
were never reported to the Illinois Department of 
Health.96  
• Healthy twenty-four-year-old Tonya Reaves died in July 
2012, at Northwestern Memorial Hospital after an elective 
abortion at a clinic on South Michigan Avenue in Chicago. 
A wrongful death suit was filed and settled by Planned 
Parenthood.97  
• A healthy twenty-nine-year-old woman, Jennifer Morbelli, 
died in January 2013, after an abortion at thirty-three 
weeks of pregnancy at an abortion clinic in Germantown, 
Maryland.98  
• Twenty-two-year-old Lakisha Wilson died on March 28, 
2014, after complications from an abortion on March 21, 
2014, at the Preterm Clinic on Shaker Boulevard in 
Cleveland, Ohio.99 
                                                                                                     
 96. Megan Twohey, State Abortion Records Full of Gaps, CHI. TRIB. (June 
16, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-16/news/ct-met-abortion-
reporting-20110615_1_abortion-providers-fewer-abortions-national-abortion-
federation (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 97. Alexis Shaw, Chicago Woman’s Family Lawyers Up After Abortion-
Related Death, ABC NEWS (July 24, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/chicago-
womans-family-lawyers-abortion-related-death/story?id=16845276 (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 98. Dan Morse, Maryland Officials Probe Possible Abortion Link in 
Woman’s Death, WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/maryland-officials-probe-possible-abortion-link-in-womans-death/2013/02/ 
09/f6bd74c2-7312-11e2-a050-b83a7b35c4b5_story.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Dan Morse, Antiabortion 
Activists Blame Germantown Clinic for Woman’s Death, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 
2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-11/local/37040544_1_abor 
tion-clinic-leroy-carhart-late-term (last visited Feb. 7, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 99.  Scott Taylor, Woman Dies After Being Rushed to Hospital Following An 
Abortion, 19 ACTION NEWS (Apr. 1, 2014),  http://www.19actionnews.com/ 
story/25133698/woman-dies-after-being-rushed-to-hospital-following-an-abortion 
(last visited Apr.. 9, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review);  Brandon Blackwell, Anti-abortion Group Accuses Cleveland Abortion 
Clinic of Fatally Botching Procedure on Columbus Woman, 22, CLEVELAND.COM 
(Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2014/04/pro-life_group_ 
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Though the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the 
Fifth Circuit have allowed health and safety regulations to go 
into effect,100 in forty years, the Supreme Court has yet to 
approve health and safety regulations in the first trimester.  
2. The Expansion to Viability (and Beyond) and the Risks of Late-
Term Abortions 
After Roe and Doe were reargued on October 11, 1972, 
Justice Blackmun distributed his second draft opinion on 
November 21, 1972, which emphasized the end of the first 
trimester (twelve weeks) as the “decisive” limit to the right to 
abortion.101 The Justices then began to negotiate over the scope of 
the abortion right they were creating. By early December, 
Justices Powell and Marshall had persuaded Justice Blackmun to 
expand the right by sixteen weeks—four whole months—from 
twelve weeks to twenty-eight weeks of pregnancy.102 There was 
never any briefing, or argument, on viability or its medical 
implications. The word viability was not mentioned even once 
                                                                                                     
accuses_clevela.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 100. See Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 
2000) (finding that South Carolina’s regulation establishing standards for 
licensing abortion clinics “serves a valid state interest”), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
1191 (2001); Greenville Women's Clinic v. Comm'r, S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. 
Control, 317 F.3d 357, 371 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding constitutional South 
Carolina’s reporting and licensing requirements for abortion clinics); Women’s 
Med. Ctr. of Nw. Hous. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 423 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that the annual 300 abortion threshold set by Texas “for subjecting abortion 
facilities to licensing bears some rational relationship to the state interest in 
protecting the health and welfare of Texas abortion patients”). 
 101. ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 134; see also id. at 133–34 
(“‘You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the first trimester is 
critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any other selected point, such as 
quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary.’” (quoting Justice Blackmun’s 
second draft opinion distributed on November 21, 1972)).  
 102. Id. at 140–42; see also id. at 138–39 (discussing Justices Marshall and 
Powell’s lobbying, which led to Blackmun’s memo in which he proposed viability 
and asked for reactions to his suggestion). After Justice Blackmun had received 
the responses, he “finally responded with another Memo to the Conference dated 
December 15, 1972, which indicated that he would change the draft to adopt 
viability.” Id. at 139. 
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during the four hours of argument in December 1971 and October 
1972.103  
Blackmun’s third draft of December 21, 1972, only four 
weeks before the decisions were publicly released, expanded the 
right to viability.104 The scope of the abortion right that the 
Justices created in Roe and Doe isolates the United States as one 
of only four nations out of 195 in the world that allows abortion 
for any reason after fetal viability. Those four are China, North 
Korea, Canada, and the United States.105 Although Justice Powell 
played a pivotal role in influencing Justice Blackmun to expand 
the abortion right to viability, Justice Powell later told his 
biographer that Roe and Doe were “the worst opinions I ever 
joined.”106  
It is important to recognize that the viability rule is directly 
connected to the state’s interest in fetal life.107 The viability rule 
is about the size and significance of the fetus. But the viability 
rule was not formulated with any serious consideration of 
maternal health or the implications for maternal health.108 There 
is almost no discussion in Roe or Doe of the implications of 
expanding the right to viability for maternal health, and there 
was no evidentiary record to assess the maternal health 
implications, though the attorney for the Georgia plaintiffs told 
                                                                                                     
 103. See Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 55–56 (discussing “the Court’s 
arbitrary expansion of the abortion right to viability,” and collecting sources 
that point out that “the viability rule was complete dictum in Roe”); Oral 
Argument, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1971/1971_70_18/argument (providing a 
full transcript of the argument). 
 104. See GARROW, supra note 56, at 585–86 (“Here I have tried to recognize 
the dual state interests of protecting the mother’s health and of protecting 
potential life.” (quoting Justice Blackmun’s December 21, 1972 cover memo) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 105. ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 126 nn.4–5. 
 106. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 341 
(1994). 
 107. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“With respect to the State’s 
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at 
viability.”). 
 108. See ABUSE OF DISCRETION, supra note 13, at 145 (“The shift to viability 
ignored the medical statistics that the Justices had, indicating that the 
immediate medical risks to women grew considerably after the first trimester.”). 
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the Justices that “mortality and complications for late abortions 
are three times greater, after twelve weeks.”109 And, in the 
twenty-nine or so abortion cases considered by the Supreme 
Court on the merits since Roe, there has been little consideration 
of the maternal health implications of the viability rule or of late-
term abortions.110 
3. “Health” Considerations in Supreme Court Abortion Cases 
Have Been a “One-Way Ratchet” 
After adopting the mantra that “abortion is safer than 
childbirth,” the Justices have operated since Roe with the 
assumption that “health” concerns are a “one-way ratchet” in 
favor of access to abortion, based on the assumption that there 
are only risks from delaying an abortion, and none from abortion 
itself. Only in 2007 in Gonzales v. Carhart111 was this “one-way 
ratchet” finally questioned and largely shelved in favor of a more 
even-handed examination of health considerations and health 
data.112 
                                                                                                     
 109. Transcript of First Oral Argument at 6, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973) (No. 70-40), available at http://www.aul.org/doe-v-bolton-transcripts/.  
 110. See generally, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Ayotte v. 
Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006); Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997); 
Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997); Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 
(1996); Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Servs., 516 U.S. 474 (1996); 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173 (1991); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 
492 U.S. 490 (1989); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 
476 U.S. 747 (1986); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); Planned 
Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City 
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); H.L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II); 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Bellotti v. 
Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); 
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Connecticut v. 
Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975). 
 111. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  
 112. See id. at 163 (providing that states have “wide discretion to pass 
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4. Shielding the Justices from New Medical Data and 
Developments 
Justice O’Connor wrote in her Akron dissent in 1983: “[a]s 
today’s decision indicates, medical technology is changing, and 
this change will necessitate our continued functioning as the 
Nation’s ‘ex officio medical board with powers to approve or 
disapprove medical and operative practices and standards 
throughout the United States.’”113 With Roe and Doe, the Justices 
assumed the role of the national abortion control board, but they 
have no means to monitor the public health impact, as public 
health officials normally do.114 The Justices cannot regulate or 
intervene in public health crises. They cannot monitor new 
technological developments or review the FDA’s approval of RU-
486.115 The Justices are completely passive and dependent on 
litigation—cases that are selectively appealed to them.116 And 
since Gonzales, there has been a concerted effort by abortion 
advocates to keep abortion cases away from the Supreme 
Court.117  
                                                                                                     
legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty”). 
 113. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 456 
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 99 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)).  
 114. See Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 64 (“With disincentives on state 
officials to create new clinic regulations, the Court is unable to do anything to 
fill the vacuum it created. As a passive institution, it must wait for a case to 
reach it . . . .”).  
 115. See Benten v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084 (1992) (denying application to 
vacate injunction against importation of RU 486 without full record of the 
medical implications of RU 486, where two justices would have vacated the 
injunction).  
 116. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012) (providing for the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction).  
 117. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, The Reincarnation of Pro-Life, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., May 29, 2011, at MM13 (“[L]itigators trying to uphold a woman’s right to 
an abortion are not running scared. In fact, they are being remarkably shrewd 
in their case selection.”); Irin Carmon, Planned Parenthood Takes Texas 
Abortion Laws to Court, MSNBC (Sept. 27, 2013), http://tv.msnbc.com/ 
2013/09/27/planned-parenthood-aclu-take-texas-abortion-laws-to-court/ (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2014) (“Notably, the groups are not challenging the provision of 
the law that bans abortion after 20 weeks.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). The strategic reason to avoid challenging that ban is that “a 
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III. Maternal Mortality Data 
The notion that “abortion is safer than childbirth” has 
become even less tenable since 1973 for at least five reasons: 
(1) the dysfunctional abortion data reporting system in the 
United States that relies completely on voluntary reporting;118 
(2) the incomparability of the published abortion mortality rate 
and the published maternal (childbirth) mortality rate;119 
(3) medical data on the increasing rate of maternal mortality in 
the second trimester;120 (4) the growing body of international 
medical studies finding long-term risks to women from 
abortion;121 and (5) maternal mortality data from countries with 
superior abortion recordkeeping collection and reporting systems, 
                                                                                                     
Texas challenge would go to the conservative Fifth Circuit,” which would 
potentially uphold the law. Id. However, “[s]imilar laws in Arizona and Idaho 
were twice found unconstitutional in the Ninth Circuit of Appeals, which is 
considered more liberal.” Id. Therefore, the combination of the Ninth Circuit 
decisions with the Fifth Circuit’s potential decision to uphold the law “would 
create a split in the circuits that would make the Supreme Court likelier to hear 
it.” Id. 
 118. See Byron Calhoun, Systematic Review: The Maternal Mortality Myth 
in the Context of Legalized Abortion, 80 LINACRE Q. 264, 264 (2013) (listing 
“numerous and complicated methodological factors that make a valid scientific 
assessment of abortion mortality extremely difficult,” including, among others, 
“incomplete reporting” and “voluntary data collection”). 
 119. See Byron C. Calhoun, John M. Thorp & Patrick S. Carroll, Maternal 
and Neonatal Health and Abortion: 40-Year Trends in Great Britain and 
Ireland, 18 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 42, 42 (2013) (“Abortion statistics, 
when published officially by governments, often tend to be inaccurate due to 
underreporting or unsubstantiated estimates due to incomplete data 
collection.”); Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13, at 60–62 (explaining the 
noncomparability of the published abortion mortality rate and the published 
childbirth mortality rate).  
 120. See Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-
Related Mortality in the United States, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 729 
(2004) (“The relative risk (unadjusted) of abortion-related mortality was 14.7 at 
13–15 weeks of gestation (95% confidence interval [CI] 6.2, 34.7), 29.5 at 16–20 
weeks (95% CI 12.9, 67.4), and 76.6 at or after 21 weeks (95% CI 32.5, 180.8).”). 
 121. See John M. Thorp Jr., Public Health Impact of Legal Termination of 
Pregnancy in the US: 40 Years Later, SCIENTIFICA, Dec. 2012, at 5, available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.6064/2012/980812 (detailing long term risks of termination 
of pregnancy).  
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which find a higher rate of abortion mortality than childbirth 
mortality.122  
The medical mantra in 1972 was based on the supposed 
comparison of maternal (childbirth) mortality rates and abortion 
mortality rates from Soviet Bloc counties.123 Today, the claim that 
“abortion is safer than childbirth” is based on the mechanical 
comparison of the official published abortion mortality rate and 
the official published childbirth (maternal) mortality rate. There 
are several reasons why these rates are non-comparable.  
There are only two national organizations that collect 
abortion data: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), a federal governmental agency, and the private Alan 
Guttmacher Institute (AGI).124 Reporting of abortion data to both 
is voluntary.125 There is no federal law requiring the reporting of 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Priscilla K. Coleman, David C. Reardon, & Byron C. Calhoun, 
Reproductive History Patterns and Long-Term Mortality Rates: A Danish, 
Population-Based Record Linkage Study, 23 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 569, 570 
(2013), http://eurpub.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/09/05/eurpub.cks107. 
full.pdf (discussing maternal and abortion mortality rates among Danish 
women); David C. Reardon & Priscilla K. Coleman, Short and Long-Term 
Mortality Rates Associated with First Pregnancy Outcome: Population Register 
Based Study for Denmark 1980–2004, 18 MED. SCI. MONITOR 71, 73 (2012) 
(same); Mika Gissler et al., Pregnancy-Associated Mortality After Birth, 
Spontaneous Abortion or Induced Abortion in Finland, 1987–2000, 18 AM. J. 
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 422, 424 (2004) (displaying “pregnancy-associated 
mortality” among Finnish women); David C. Reardon et al., Deaths Associated 
with Pregnancy Outcome: A Record Linkage Study of Low Income Women, 85 S. 
MED. J. 834, 836–37 (2002) (discussing maternal and abortion mortality rates 
among Californian women); Mika Gissler et al., Pregnancy-Associated Deaths in 
Finland 1987–1994: Definition Problems and Benefits of Record Linkage, 76 
ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 651, 653 (1997) (discussing 
maternal and abortion mortality rates among Finnish women). 
 123. Supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 124. Rebekah Saul, Abortion Reporting in the United States: An 
Examination of the Federal-State Partnership, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3024498.html (last visited Jan. 24, 
2014) (discussing national reporting and noting only two sources, the “CDC’s 
abortion surveillance system . . . [which is] the sole governmental source of 
abortion data” and “[t]he Alan Guttmacher Institute (AGI), which collects 
abortion data by surveying providers directly”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 125. See Calhoun, supra note 118, at 265 (explaining that the CDC data 
“base their estimates on voluntary submissions” and the “abortion reporting by 
[A]GI is based on voluntary submissions”).  
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abortion data, or complications, or deaths. Because abortion 
reporting in the United States is completely voluntary, there are 
only estimates of the number of abortions annually and of the 
number of abortion deaths.126 As one researcher noted in 2008, 
“[m]any state health departments are able to obtain only 
incomplete data from abortion providers, and in some states, only 
forty to fifty percent of abortions are reported.”127 Death 
certificates have been found to be unreliable.128 The bottom line is 
that they are non-comparable because what goes into the 
numerators and the denominators of each is radically different.129 
This is explained at length in a medical review article published 
in the January 2013 issue of the online journal Scientifica and in 
a 2013 article in The Linacre Quarterly.130  
A 2012 article by Raymond and Grimes—perhaps the latest 
to make the claim that abortion is safer than childbirth—simply 
repeats the defective and misleading methodology of the past 
forty years and fails to demonstrate that abortion is safer for 
                                                                                                     
 126. See id. (“Abortion data are simply not complete and those provided are 
merely estimates with huge variance, and are subject to considerable error.”).  
 127. Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and 
Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 7 (2008); see 
also Rachel K. Jones et al., Underreporting of Induced and Spontaneous 
Abortion in the United States: An Analysis of the 2002 National Survey of 
Family Growth, 38 STUD. IN FAM. PLAN. 187, 189 (2007) (“Although the 
Guttmacher Institute estimates of numbers of abortions are regarded as the 
most comprehensive source of abortion statistics in the United States, the 
estimates may be inaccurate.” (citation omitted)). 
 128. See Isabelle L. Horon et al., Underreporting of Maternal Deaths on 
Death Certificates and the Magnitude of the Problem of Maternal Mortality, 95 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 478, 478 (2005) (explaining the underestimated magnitude 
of maternal mortality rates due to inaccurate physician death certificate 
reporting).  
 129. See Clarke D. Forsythe & Bradley N. Kehr, A Road Map Through the 
Supreme Court’s Back Alley, 57 VILL. L. REV. 45, 60 (2012) (explaining the 
incomparability of the abortion mortality rates and childbirth mortality rates 
due to differences in calculation of each ratio).  
 130. See Thorp, supra note 121, at 2 (“Moreover, [terminations of pregnancy] 
cannot be linked to other sources of health data such as birth or death 
certificates, thereby making precise calculation of mortality rates or subsequent 
birth outcomes impossible.”); see also Calhoun, supra note 118, at 266–72 
(explaining the reasons why abortion mortality and maternal mortality 
measurements are unreliable). 
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several reasons.131 It is based on U.S. data, which is unreliable 
because of the dysfunctional data collection and reporting system 
in the United States that depends completely on voluntary 
reporting.132 It is based on mere estimates of the number of 
abortions, as reported by the CDC, and estimates of rates; yet the 
CDC admits that it undercounts abortions by fifteen percent, 
because abortion reporting to the CDC is voluntary.133 Consider 
the fact that several states, like California with one-third of all 
abortions annually, do not report to the CDC.134 Raymond and 
Grimes claim that “[t]he risk of death associated with childbirth 
is approximately fourteen times higher than with abortion.”135 
But as one careful medical researcher pointed out, “[t]his 
statement is unsupported by the literature and there is no 
credible scientific basis to support it.”136  
In contrast to the unreliable U.S. data, two international 
studies in the past two years look at maternal mortality data 
from Chile and Ireland, which both limit abortion. A 2012 study 
of maternal mortality in Chile relied on fifty years (1957–2007) of 
official data from Chile’s National Institute of Statistics.137 The 
                                                                                                     
 131. See Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety 
of Legal Induced Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS 
& GYNECOLOGY 215, 215–16 (2012) (explaining the materials and calculation 
methods used for the article). 
 132.  Thorp, supra note 121, at 3 (“Because this system is voluntary, and 
also due to the inherent reluctance of surgeons to disclose serious complications 
such as death, underreporting is a major problem.”).   
 133. Id.; see also Karen Pazol, et al., Abortion Surveillance—United States, 
2010, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Nov. 29, 2013, at 11 (noting CDC 
reporting and counting practice “inflates abortion statistics for reporting areas” 
with high percentages of out-of-state abortion recipients and “undercounts 
abortions for states with limited abortion services,” high legal restrictions, or 
“geographic proximity to services in another state”). 
 134. See Calhoun, supra note 118, at 265 (“Current incidence estimates 
exclude abortion in California . . . .”).  
 135. Raymond & Grimes, supra note 131, at 216. 
 136. Calhoun, supra note 118, at 264.  
 137. Elard Koch & John Thorp et al., Women’s Education Level, Maternal 
Health Facilities, Abortion Legislation and Maternal Deaths: A Natural 
Experiment in Chile from 1957 to 2007, PLOS ONE, May 2012, at 2, 
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2
Fjournal.pone.0036613&representation=PDF (noting the Chilean data 
extraction from 1957 to present).  
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authors looked at factors likely to affect maternal mortality, such 
as years of education, per capita income, total fertility rate, birth 
order, clean water supply, sanitary sewer, and childbirth delivery 
by skilled attendants.138 They also looked at pertinent 
educational and maternal health policies, including legislation 
that has prohibited abortion in Chile since 1989, to assess the 
effects of these policies on maternal mortality.139 One of the most 
striking findings is that, contrary to widely held assumptions, 
prohibiting abortion in Chile did not result in an increase in 
maternal mortality.140 In fact, maternal mortality declined after 
Chile’s 1989 abortion prohibition was enacted.141 From 1957 to 
2007, the overall Maternal Mortality Ratio or MMR (the number 
of maternal deaths related to childbearing divided by the number 
of live births) declined by 93.8%, from 270.7 deaths per 100,000 
live births in 1957 to 18.2 deaths per 100,000 live births in 
2007.142 After abortion was made illegal in 1989, the MMR 
continued to decline—from 41.3 to 12.7 per 100,000 live births (-
69.2%).143 Chile has the lowest maternal mortality ratio in Latin 
America.144  
A 2012 study of Irish data compared maternal mortality and 
maternal health trends in Ireland with those in England, 
Scotland, and Wales.145 The study compared the populations 
                                                                                                     
 138. See id. at 2, 7 (explaining the factors considered including graphs of 
maternal mortality ratios based on these factors). 
 139. See id. at 9 (discussing abortion legislation and its effects on maternal 
mortality). 
 140. See id. at 3 (charting the decline in maternal mortality rate in Chile). 
 141. See id. at 9 (“After abortion became illegal in 1989, a decreasing trend 
in [Maternal Mortality Rate] was observed, from 41.3 to 12.7 in 2003 (69.2% 
reduction).”). 
 142. Id. at 3. 
 143. Id. at 5, 9; see also Elard Koch et al., Fundamental Discrepancies in 
Abortion Estimates and Abortion-Related Mortality: A Re-Evaluation of Recent 
Studies in Mexico with Special Reference to the International Classification of 
Diseases, 4 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 613, 618 (2012) (showing declining graphed 
maternal mortality ratios in Chile). 
 144. See Koch, supra note 143, at 618 (“The findings of this study confirm 
that [Maternal Mortality Rate] in Chile has steadily and consistently decreased, 
reaching the lowest rate in Latin America . . . .”). 
 145. See Byron C. Calhoun, John M. Thorp & Patrick S. Carroll, Maternal 
and Neonatal Health and Abortion: The 40-Year Experience in Great Britain and 
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living in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland with 
those in Scotland and England, and examined women’s health 
trends between 1969 and 2009.146 The report examined numerous 
women’s health factors, including fertility, premature birth rates, 
stillbirth rates, mental health resource usage, medication usage 
for mental health, breast cancer rates, and immunological 
disorders.147 Among the most significant findings are that the 
rates of stillbirths in the Republic and Northern Ireland are 
significantly less than similar rates in England and Scotland. 
Rates of stillbirth per 1,000 live births were 3.8/1,000 in the Irish 
Republic and 4.1/1,000 in Northern Ireland, compared to 4.9 in 
England, and 5.1 in Scotland.148  
The study found similar contrasts in the rates of low-birth 
weight infants. Low birth weight infants (<2,500 grams) were 
increased in England and Scotland compared to the Irish 
Republic (39.7/1,000 live births in the Irish Republic, 56.3/1,000 
in England, and 52.3/1,000 in Scotland).149 These findings are 
consistent with previous studies that have found higher rates of 
stillbirths, premature births, and low-birth-weight infants in 
women with a history of induced abortion.150  
The Irish study also looked at maternal mortality in Ireland 
compared to England, Scotland and Wales. Maternal death rates 
per 100,000 live births were significantly higher in the 
English/Welsh populations and Scottish populations (10/100,000 
                                                                                                     
Ireland, 18 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 42, 46 (2013), http://www.jpands.org/ 
vol18no2/calhoun.pdf (detailing a comparative study of abortion and maternal 
mortality rates in Ireland, Scotland, England, and Wales). 
 146. See id. at 46 (“Over the 40 years of legalized abortion in the UK there 
has been a consistent pattern in which higher abortion rates have run parallel 
to higher incidence of stillbirths, premature births, low birth-weight neonates, 
cerebral palsy, and maternal deaths as sequelae of abortion.”). 
 147. Id. at 44.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  
 150. See 135 Statistically Significant Studies: Abortion—Preterm Birth 
and/or Low Birth Weight Links 60s-12, PHYSICIANSFORLIFE.ORG (Dec. 1, 2012), 
http://www.physiciansforlife.org/content/view/2305/26/ (last visited Jan. 25, 
2014) (listing studies that show an increased risk of pre-term birth among 
women with prior induced abortion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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in England/Wales, and 10–12/100,000 in Scotland), compared to 
the Irish population (1–2/100,000 live births in the Irish 
Republic).151  
The study also looked at demographic trends in Ireland. 
While the fall in fertility throughout Europe since 1968 has 
impacted Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland 
continue to show higher fertility rates.152 The Total Fertility Rate 
(TFR) is near to 2.0 in both Irish jurisdictions. (This corresponds 
to a family of two children.) That rate is much higher than the 
average European TFR (around 1.4) and close to the replacement 
level of 2.07 TFR.153 As a result, Ireland has a substantially 
younger population.  
The Irish study suggests, at the very least, that the claim 
that legal abortion is necessary for improved maternal health is 
dubious.154 
                                                                                                     
 151. See Calhoun et al., supra note 145, at 43 (“These rates are instructive 
since they demonstrate a relatively low [Total Abortion Rate] in both Irish 
jurisdictions compared with England, Wales, and Scotland (Great Britain).”).  
 152. See id. at 76 (noting that for Northern Ireland “the latest [Total 
Fertility Rate] is 1.87” and for the Republic of Ireland “Forecasting used the . . . 
[Total Fertility Rate] of 1.86]”).  
 153. See id. at 75 (charting the eight European countries against the 
“Replacement Level 2.07”).  
 154. The notion that the tragic death of Savita Halappanavar in Ireland in 
October 2012 shows the dangers of abortion prohibitions is not based on reliable 
data. RTE, Ireland’s “NPR,” reported that the Health Information and Quality 
Authority (HIQA) “report on Savita Halappanavar case finds ‘basic care’ 
failures.”  See HIQA Report on Savita Halappanavar Case Finds ‘Basic Care’ 
Failures, RTE, http://www.rte.ie/news/2013/1009/ 479282-savita-halappanavar/  
(last updated Oct. 10, 2013) (last visited Dec. 30, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review)). The main documents in the case are the 
inquest results (HSE report) and the HIQA report. SABARATNAM ARULKUMARAN, 
FINAL REPORT: INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENT 50278 FROM TIME OF PATIENT’S SELF-
REFERRAL TO HOSPITAL ON THE 21ST OF OCTOBER 2012 TO THE PATIENT’S DEATH ON 
THE 28TH OF OCTOBER, 2012, at 1 (June 2013), http://cdn.thejournal.ie 
/media/2013/06/savita-halappanavar-hse-report.pdf; Patient Safety Investigation 
Report Published by Health Information and Quality Authority, HEALTH INFO. & 
QUALITY AUTH. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.hiqa.ie/press-release/2013-10-09-
patient-safety-investigation-report-published-health-information-and-qualit 
(last visited Dec. 30, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
They show that the death of Savita Halappanavar was due to “inevitable 
miscarriage” at seventeen weeks and the failure to properly diagnose and treat 
sepsis (infection), and had nothing to do with the legal status of abortion in 
Ireland. HEALTH INFO. AND QUALITY AUTH., INVESTIGATION INTO THE SAFETY, 
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Another maternal mortality study published in 2013 looked 
at all Danish women born between 1962 and 1993.155 The study 
found a protective effect from childbirth and found that the 
higher the number of abortions, the higher the mortality risk for 
women.156  
Another study published in 2013 looked at maternal 
mortality data in Mexico.157 The authors sought to clarify the 
data that goes into the numerators and denominators of mortality 
rates over the past twenty years (1990–2008) in Mexico.158 They 
found a substantial drop in maternal deaths and a substantial 
reduction in abortion-related mortality in Mexico between 1990 
and 2010 and that “approximately ninety-eight percent of 
maternal deaths are related to causes other than illegal induced 
abortion in Mexico.”159  
Thus, these three recent medical studies, of abortion 
prohibitions in Ireland, Chile, and Mexico, suggest that countries 
with abortion prohibitions have lower maternal mortality rates, 
better women’s health trends, and better demographic trends 
than countries with widely-accessible abortion.  
                                                                                                     
QUALITY AND STANDARDS OF SERVICES PROVIDED BY THE HEALTH SERVICE 
EXECUTIVE TO PATIENTS, INCLUDING PREGNANT WOMEN, AT RISK OF CLINICAL 
DETERIORATION, INCLUDING THOSE PROVIDED IN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL GALWAY, 
AND AS REFLECTED IN THE CARE AND TREATMENT PROVIDED TO SAVITA 
HALAPPANAVAR (Oct. 7, 2013), http://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/ 
hiqareport.pdf. If the hospital would have recognized the life-threatening 
situation they could have evacuated the woman’s uterus, but they did not 
recognize that she had sepsis. More than anything, the case is a medical 
malpractice case.  
 155. See Coleman, Reardon & Calhoun, supra note 122, at 569 (“In this 
Danish population-based study, records of women born between 1962 and 
1993 . . . were examined to identify associations between patterns of pregnancy 
resolution and mortality rates across 25 years.”). 
 156. See id. at 4 (“[T]hose who had experienced induced abortion(s) and 
natural loss(es) had more than three times the risk of death compared with 
women who had only experienced birth(s).”). 
 157. Koch et al., supra note 143, at 613. 
 158. See id. at 615–16 (noting discrepancy in “calculating the numerator of 
[the Abortion Mortality Ratio]” and “discrepancy [relating] to the calculation of 
the denominator”).  
 159. Id. at 622.  
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IV. International Medical Data on the Risks of Induced Abortion 
In the twenty years since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,160 
the number of international, peer-reviewed medical studies on 
the risks from abortion has grown significantly. Medical studies 
over the last two decades have created substantial data finding 
significant increased risks after abortion, as a January 2013, 
medical review article in Scientifica describes in detail.161  
It is important to handle these data carefully. First, the 
studies focus on “increased risk” after abortion, which is not the 
same thing as causation, though increased risk and other 
indicators may eventually prove causation.162 Second, some 
medical studies have found no increased risk after abortion.163 
They need to be taken into consideration.  
A. Increased Risk of Pre-Term Birth (PTB) After Induced Abortion 
Nevertheless, there are now more than 140 peer-reviewed 
studies that have found a statistically significant increased risk 
in pre-term birth (PTB) after abortion.164 This has particular 
                                                                                                     
 160. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 161. See Thorp, supra note 121, at 4–5 (explaining the short and long-term 
harms of termination of pregnancy); see also 135 Statistically Significant 
Studies: Abortion—Preterm Birth and/or Low Birth Weight Links 60s-12, supra 
note 150 (listing studies finding an increased risk of preterm birth and low birth 
weight following abortion). 
 162. Id. at 5. 
 163. See Julia R. Steinberg et al., Fatal Flaws in a Recent Meta-Analysis on 
Abortion and Mental Health, 86 CONTRACEPTION 430, 430 (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22579105 (last visited Feb. 5, 2014) 
(suggesting that there is no increased risk of mental trauma after abortion) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Claire Oliver-Williams et al., 
Changes in Association Between Previous Therapeutic Abortion and Preterm 
Birth in Scotland, 1980 to 2008: A Historical Cohort Study, PLOS MED. 10 (July 
2013), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2 
F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1001481&representation=PDF (suggesting no 
increased risk of pre-term birth after abortion in recent years with new 
methods).  
 164. 135 Statistically Significant Studies: Abortion—Preterm Birth and/or 
Low Birth Weight Links 60s-12, supra note 150.  
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relevance for African-American women, who have an “almost two-
fold higher rate of preterm births.”165 These studies found an 
increased risk of PTB after induced abortion among women from 
more than thirty-five countries, including: Wales, Egypt, the 
United States, China, Japan, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Britain, 
Thailand, Australia, Norway, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Scotland, the Czech Republic, Spain, 
Slovenia, Romania, Russia, Denmark, Brazil, Botswana, Togo, 
Taiwan, Nigeria, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Kuwait, Korea, Canada, 
and Turkey.166 
A PLOS Medicine study published in July 2013 by Oliver-
Williams et al. has been reported as claiming that the increased 
risk of pre-term birth after induced abortion has been eliminated 
by modern methods of abortion.167 But the actual study falls short 
of making that claim and seems to suffer from a number of 
methodological flaws. (The authors start by admitting what has 
been denied by so many for so long: “Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that therapeutic termination of pregnancy 
(abortion) is associated with an increased risk of subsequent 
preterm birth”).168 The abortions were self-reported from personal 
interviews (not drawn from medical record data or linked to the 
specific patient).169 That seems unusual for data from Scotland, 
where the government pays for abortions and keeps individual 
records.170 The abortion methods (chemical v. surgical) were not 
                                                                                                     
 165. Thomas F. McElrath, Unappreciated But Not Unimportant: Health 
Disparities in the Risk of Cervical Insufficiency, 25 HUM. REPROD. 2891, 2891 
(2010); see also Emmanuel A. Anum et al., Health Disparities in Risk for 
Cervical Insufficiency, 25 HUM. REPRO. 2894, 2899 (2010) (discussing the 
increased risk of African-American women for “cervical insufficiency” which is a 
cause of pre-term birth). This is magnified by a “dose effect” if a woman has had 
two, three, or four prior terminations of pregnancy (TOPs). McElrath, supra 
note 165, at 2892.  
 166. See 135 Statistically Significant Studies: Abortion—Preterm Birth 
and/or Low Birth Weight Links 60s-12, supra note 150. 
 167. See Oliver-Williams et al., supra note 163, at 10 (suggesting that 
“[modernizing] methods of abortion . . . may significantly reduce the subsequent 
burden of morbidity and mortality related to preterm births”). 
 168. Id. at 1.  
 169. See id. at 2 (explaining the methodology of the study, which relied on 
self-reported data). 
 170. Abortion, NAT’L HEALTH SERVS., http://www.nhs.uk/conditions/abortion/ 
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actually connected with the individual women, preventing the 
researchers from knowing which type of abortion the women had 
or even whether they experienced PTB.171 So, the authors’ 
conclusion that shifting from surgical to chemical abortions 
eliminated the risk of PTB is no more than a guess and not a 
finding drawn from scientifically observed evidence. The authors 
emphasize the technique of pre-treating of the cervix prior to 
abortion as supposedly reducing the risk of PTB, but there was no 
data to connect this.172 It was merely the authors’ hunch. 
Consequently, the Oliver-Williams study hardly dispels the 
findings of more than 140 international studies from more than 
thirty countries finding an increased risk of PTB after abortion.  
B. Increased Risk of Mental Trauma After Induced Abortion 
Whether negative mental health outcome is associated with 
induced abortion is one of the most hotly debated questions in 
medicine today. There are studies on both sides of the question.173 
The studies and the data have to be handled carefully. No one 
study settles a medical question. And association does not mean 
causation.  
Nevertheless, many would be surprised to learn that there at 
least ninety-nine international, peer-reviewed, statistically 
                                                                                                     
pages/Introduction.aspx (last updated Dec. 6, 2012) (last visited Jan. 25, 2014) 
(noting that the National Health Service is funded by taxes in Europe and “[i]n 
some areas, the [National Health Service] will pay for abortions at private 
clinics”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 171. Oliver-Williams et al., supra note 163, at 2. 
 172. See id. at 1 (noting that the association between previous abortion and 
pre-term birth disappeared by 2000 in Scotland, “paralleled by increasing use of 
medical abortion and cervical pre-treatment . . .”). Although these trends were 
possibly related, “we could not test this directly as the data on the method of 
prior abortions were not linked to individuals in the cohort.” Id. 
 173. Compare Francesco Bianchi-Demicheli et al., Termination of Pregnancy 
and Women’s Sexuality, 53 GYNECOLOGIC & OBSTETRIC INVESTIGATION 48, 50 
(2002) (explaining the increased psychological impact, and sexual dysfunction of 
termination of pregnancy), with Anne Nordal Broen et al., The Course of Mental 
Health After Miscarriage and Induced Abortion: A Longitudinal, Five-Year 
Follow-Up Study, 3 BMC MED. 17, 17 (2005) (“Women who had experienced a 
miscarriage had more mental distress at ten days and six months after the 
pregnancy termination than women who had undergone an abortion.”).  
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significant studies that have found an increased risk of mental 
trauma after induced abortion.174 A 2013 forty-year review essay 
published in Scientifica reviewed the existing data on three 
reputed long-term risks of induced abortion: pre-term birth, 
breast cancer, and mental trauma.175 The author cited the 
numerous studies that have found an increased risk of mental 
trauma after induced abortion.176  
A study published in September 2011 in the British Journal 
of Psychiatry (BJP) critically reviewed the results of twenty-two 
previous studies on abortion and mental health published 
between 1995 and 2009.177 The results revealed a moderate to 
high increased risk of mental health problems after abortion.178 
This study has sparked a contentious debate in the literature.179  
                                                                                                     
 174. See infra Appendix B; see also WE CARE EXPERTS, PSYCHOLOGICAL, 
RELATIONSHIP, AND BEHAVIORAL IMPLICATIONS OF ABORTION: BIBLIOGRAPHY OF 
PEER-REVIEWED STUDIES, http://www.wecareexperts.org/sites/default/files/ 
articles/Bibliography%20of%20Peer%20Reviewed%20Studies%20on%20Psychol
ogy%20of%20Abortion.pdf (listing international peer-reviewed studies on 
psychological implications of abortion).  
 175. See Thorp, supra note 121, at 5 (noting pre-term birth, breast cancer, 
and mental health problems as three conditions “in which the literature is more 
comprehensive in reporting links between [termination of pregnancy] and the 
health outcome in question”).  
 176. See id. at 13–16 (listing several studies reviewing mental trauma and 
its connection to abortion). 
 177. See Priscilla K. Coleman, Abortion and Mental Health: Quantitative 
Synthesis and Analysis of Research Published, 1995–2009, 199 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 
180, 182 (2011) (“After applying the inclusion criteria and rules . . . the sample 
consisted of 22 peer-reviewed studies.”). This study has sparked a vigorous 
debate in the literature, including a response by the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists. ACAD. OF MED. ROYAL COLLS., INDUCED ABORTION AND MENTAL 
HEALTH 125 (2011), http://www.nccmh.org.uk/reports/ABORTION_REPORT 
_WEB%20FINAL.pdf  
 178. See ACAD. OF MED. ROYAL COLLS., supra note 177, at 180 (noting that 
“the results revealed a moderate to highly increased risk of mental health 
problems after abortion”). 
 179. See Responses to This Article, BRITISH J. OF PSYCHIATRY, 
http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/199/3/180.abstract#responses (last visited Jan. 2, 
2014) (providing access to responses to Priscilla Coleman’s article titled Abortion 
and Mental Health) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
David M. Fergusson et al., Does Abortion Reduce the Mental Health Risks of 
Unwanted or Unintended Pregnancy? A Re-Appraisal of the Evidence, 47 AUSTL. 
N.Z. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 819, 819–27 (2013) (considering whether abortion has 
therapeutic benefits to mitigate the mental health risks of abortion). This study 
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Two possible objections to studies finding an increased risk 
are that they fail to include appropriate comparison group(s) and 
that they fail to control for pre-existing conditions, and much of 
the debate centers on these factors.180 Four subsequent studies 
and reviews, by Charles,181 Robinson,182 one written for the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists (RCP),183 and by Steinberg184 have 
challenged the 2011 BJP study. But each has weaknesses of its 
own.  
A 2013 study by researcher David Fergusson reviewed the 
2011 BJP study and other studies published since 2011 criticizing 
the BJP study.185 Fergusson concluded that “there is no available 
evidence to suggest that abortion has therapeutic effects in 
reducing the mental health risks of unwanted unintended 
pregnancy. There is suggestive evidence that abortion may be 
associated with small to moderate increases in risks of some 
mental health problems.”186 Despite the ongoing debate, there 
remain a number of well-done studies that have found an 
increased risk of mental trauma after abortion. 
                                                                                                     
was recently criticized in an essay. See Steinberg, supra note 163, at 430 (noting 
that the authors “strongly question the quality of this meta-analysis of 22 
papers . . . just as the reliability, validity and replicability of some of the 
studies . . . in the meta-analysis have been questioned”). 
 180. See Steinberg et al., supra note 163, at 431–32 (noting the “seven 
significant errors in the methods, analyses and reasoning of Coleman's meta-
analysis”).  
 181. See Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-Term Mental Health 
Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 436 
(2009) (identifying methodological issues in studies that found an “abortion 
trauma syndrome”).  
 182. See Gail E. Robinson et al., Is There An ‘Abortion Trauma Syndrome’? 
Critiquing the Evidence, 17 HARV. R. PSYCHIATRY 268, 268 (2009) (suggesting 
that the most accurate studies found no, or few risks of mental health caused by 
abortion). 
 183. See ACAD. OF MED. ROYAL COLLS., supra note 177, at 17 (“No details of 
any quality assessment process were included in the Coleman review.”). 
 184. Steinberg et al., supra note 163, at 430 (presenting a “summary of the 
most serious and significant errors of [the Coleman] meta-analysis because 
policy, practice and the public have been misinformed”). 
 185. Fergusson et al., supra note 179, at 821 (noting that the Coleman study 
“fail[s] to provide a formal review of the therapeutic benefits of abortion”). 
 186. Id. at 819. 
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C. Increased Risk of Breast Cancer from the Loss of the Protective 
Effect of a First Full-Term Pregnancy 
The claim that abortion increases the risk of breast cancer is 
also vigorously debated. It has long been acknowledged that a 
first full-term pregnancy provides a measure of protection against 
breast cancer.187  
Yet, there have been seventy international, peer-reviewed 
studies that have addressed the association since at least 1957.188 
At least thirty-three have found an increased risk of breast 
cancer after induced abortion.189  
All of these preceded the Huang study. A November 2013 
study by Huang et al. of Chinese women published in Cancer 
Causes & Controls looked at the association between abortion 
and breast cancer.190 The meta-analysis by Huang et al. 
examined the findings and quality of thirty-six studies (consisting 
of two cohort studies and thirty-four case control studies) from 
fourteen provinces in China that had been previously 
published.191 The authors acknowledged that “Chinese females 
historically had a lower risk of breast cancer compared to their 
counterparts in the USA and other Western countries.”192 Citing 
a 2012 Chinese study by Li, the authors noted that “the incidence 
                                                                                                     
 187. See, e.g., Julie Lecarpentier et al., Variation in Breast Cancer Risk 
Associated with Factors Related to Pregnancies, 14 BREAST CANCER RESEARCH 1 
(2012) (finding a protective effect against breast cancer for women when they 
experienced a full-term pregnancy).  
 188. See Epidemiologic Studies: Induced Abortion and Breast Cancer Risk, 
BREAST CANCER PREVENTION INST., http://www.bcpinstitute.org/epidemiology 
_studies_bcpi.htm (last updated Nov. 2013) (last visited Mar. 17, 2014) (listing 
studies comparing abortion to risk of breast cancer) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 189. See infra Appendix C. 
 190. See Yubei Huang et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Association Between 
Induced Abortion and Breast Cancer Risk Among Chinese Females, CANCER 
CAUSES & CONTROL (Nov. 2013), http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs 
10552-013-0325-7#page-1 (last visited Mar. 17, 2014) (“Compared to people 
without any history of [induced abortion], an increased risk of breast cancer was 
observed among females who had at least one [induced abortion].”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 2. 
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of breast cancer in China had increased at an alarming rate over 
the past two decades”193 and that this “marked change in breast 
cancer incidence was paralleled [sic] to the one-child-per-family 
policy,” citing a 2002 Chinese study by Qiao.194 This new study 
was undertaken, at least in part, due to conflicting results in 
prior studies by Brind (1996) and Beral (2004) and due to 
conflicting results in prior Chinese studies.195  
Citing three studies by Russo & Russo (1987), Kelsey (1979), 
and Kelsey (1981), the authors noted that prior “experimental 
data” provided a plausible biological reason for an association 
between induced abortion and an increased risk of breast cancer:  
During the first trimester of pregnancy, hormonal changes 
propel newly produced breast cells through a state of 
differentiation, a natural maturing process which greatly 
reduces the risk of breast cancer in the future. An interruption 
of this process by abortion will arrest this process before 
differentiation occurs, greatly raising the future risk of breast 
cancer in the future.196  
The authors were also careful to distinguish induced abortion 
from spontaneous abortion.197  
The authors concluded that “overall, this systematic review 
of thirty-six studies with different designs and conducted across a 
                                                                                                     
 193. Id.; see also Ai-Ren Jiang et al., Abortions and Breast Cancer Risk in 
Premenopausal and Postmenopausal Women in Jiangsu Province of China, 13 
ASIAN PAC. J. CANCER PREVENTION 33, 33 (2012) (noting a “marked increase” in 
the rates of breast cancer in China in recent years).  
 194. Id. (citing Qiao, Analysis of Induced Abortion of Chinese Women, 26 
POPULATION RES. 16 (2002)) 
 195. Compare Joel Brind et al., Induced Abortion as an Independent Risk 
Factor for Breast Cancer: A Comprehensive Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 481, 494 (1996) (noting a “significant 
positive association between induced abortion and breast cancer incidence”), 
with Valerie Beral et al., Breast Cancer and Abortion: Collaborative Reanalysis 
of Data from 53 Epidemiological Studies, Including 83,000 Women with Breast 
Cancer from 16 Countries, 363 THE LANCET 1007, 1014 (2004) (noting “the 
aggregate relative risk of breast cancer associated with having a record of one or 
more pregnancies that ended as an induced abortion compared with having no 
such record . . . [suggests] no significant adverse effects . . . ”).  
 196. Huang et al., supra note 190, at 2. 
 197. See id. (“[S]tudies focused on spontaneous abortion, and studies with 
incomplete data of interest were excluded.”).  
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wide range of regions in China revealed that induced abortion 
(IA) was significantly associated with an increased risk of breast 
cancer among Chinese females. The risk increased as the number 
of IA increased.”198 This is referred to by statisticians as a “dose-
response” or “dose-effect”; the stronger the exposure (dose) to the 
agent, the greater the increased risk.199 And the authors noted 
that previous studies supported this dose-effect, finding that the 
risk increased as the number of abortions increased.200  
The Huang study found a “dose-response.”201 Thus, one prior 
induced abortion increased the breast cancer risk by forty-four 
percent.202 With two prior induced abortions, they found a 
seventy-six percent increased risk.203 And with three prior 
induced abortions, they found an eighty-nine percent increased 
risk.204 (Each finding was statistically significant, meaning that it 
was not due to chance alone.)205 
The authors noted an important difference between induced 
abortion in the United States and in China, which may help 
explain the biological association. Since abortion in the United 
States is often to prevent a first birth, whereas abortion is used in 
China to prevent a second birth under the one-child policy, “the 
protective effects of early childbirth will probably dilute the 
harmful effect of more IAs [induced abortions].”206 The authors 
                                                                                                     
 198. Id. at 7. 
 199. See Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD.ORG (Sept. 25, 2001), 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=671 (last updated Dec. 11, 2001) 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (“The dose-effect relationship is the relationship 
between the dose of harm-producing substances or factors and the severity of 
their effect on exposed organisms or matter.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 200. Huang et al., supra note 190, at 8.  
 201. Id.   
 202. Id. at 4.  
 203. Id. at 6.  
 204. Id.  
 205. See Glossary of Statistical Terms, OECD.ORG (May 26, 2002), 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3904 (last updated Aug. 11, 2005) 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2014) (“An effect is said to be significant if the value of the 
statistic used to test it lies outside acceptable limits, that is to say, if the 
hypothesis that the effect is not present is rejected.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 206. Huang et al., supra note 190, at 8.   
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noted that further research was needed because of certain 
limitations in their study.207  
D. Placenta Previa 
Placenta previa is the condition when the placenta settles 
low in the mother’s uterus, covering the cervical canal.208 If it 
remains in this position in late pregnancy, it can have serious 
risks for mother, including hemorrhaging, and for the child, 
including increased risk of sudden infant death syndrome and 
risks from prematurity if a premature delivery is required.209 A 
2003 review of the literature located three studies that found an 
increased risk of placenta previa after abortion.210 A fourth study 
was published in 2003, which found an increased risk of placenta 
previa after abortion.211 
These studies do not settle these medical and scientific 
questions, though they provide evidence of increased risks of 
various kinds. At the same time, no studies have yet refuted the 
findings of increased risk of pre-term birth, or mental trauma, or 
                                                                                                     
 207. See id. (noting that “future prospective cohort studies with more 
adequate reference group were needed to investigate the association further” 
because of possible overstated positive associations between induced abortions 
and breast cancer in the studies reviewed).   
 208. See Diseases and Conditions: Placenta Previa, MAYO CLINIC (Jun. 2, 
2011), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/placenta-previa/basics/ 
definition/con-20032219 (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (“Placenta Previa occurs 
when a baby’s placenta partially or totally covers the mother’s cervix . . . .”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 209. See id. (“One of the biggest concerns with placenta previa is the risk of 
severe vaginal bleeding (hemhorrage),” which can be “heavy enough to be life-
threatening” and “may prompt an emergency C-section before [the] baby is full 
term.”). 
 210. See John M. Thorp, Jr., Katherine E. Hartmann & Elizabeth 
Shadigian, Long-Term Physical and Psychological Health Consequences of 
Induced Abortion: A Review of the Evidence, 58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOL. SURVEY 
67, 74 (2003), http://content.silaspartners.com/156/41045/156_41045_shadigian. 
1.pdf (“Three studies were found exploring induced abortion and placenta 
previa,” all of which found a “positive association”). 
 211. L.G. Johnson, B.A. Mueller & J. R. Daling, The Relationship of Placenta 
Previa and History of Induced Abortion, 81 INT’L J. GYNECOL. & OBSTETRICS 191 
(2003). 
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breast cancer after an abortion. More studies are clearly needed, 
and more can be expected from various countries with better 
abortion data recordkeeping and collection than exists in the 
United States.  
V. Isaacson v. Horne, the Medical Assumption, and the Viability 
Rule 
The mistakes made by the Justices during the deliberations 
in Roe and Doe, including the notion that “abortion is safer than 
childbirth,” are directly relevant to the Court’s consideration of 
state abortion regulations in future abortion cases. The Court in 
Gonzales v. Carhart212 in 2007 upheld the constitutionality of the 
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (PBABA).213 But, as a 
number of scholars have pointed out, the Court expressed concern 
with late-term abortions and, in dictum, suggested that the states 
should have greater deference to limit late-term abortions.214 The 
Court’s dicta gave greater deference to the states and concluded 
that the states have “wide discretion to pass legislation in areas 
where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”215 
The twenty-week limit in Isaacson v. Horne216 might have 
given the Court the opportunity to apply Gonzales and review the 
factual assumption that “abortion is safer than childbirth,” 
because medical data show that the maternal mortality rate from 
abortion increases significantly in the second trimester.217 Horne 
could have given the Court the opportunity to reassess its factual 
                                                                                                     
 212. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  
 213. Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).  
 214. See Gonzales, 550 U.S at 128 (noting that “[t]he Act’s stated purposes 
are protecting innocent human life from [partial-birth abortion] and protecting 
the medical community’s ethics and reputation” and that “Casey reaffirmed that 
the government may use its . . . regulatory authority to show its profound 
respect for the life within the women (citation omitted)”).  
 215. Id. at 163. 
 216. 884 F. Supp. 2d 961, 971 (D. Ariz. 2012), rev’d, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 
2013), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sep. 27, 2013) (No. 13-402) (concluding the 
statute survives a facial constitutional challenge), rev’d, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 82 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. 2014).). 
 217. See Bartlett, supra note 120.  
870 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 827 (2014) 
assumption that drove the superstructure of Roe in light of 
contemporary medical data in the context of late-term abortions.  
In the approximately thirty abortion cases that the Court has 
decided on the merits since 1973, the Court has rarely addressed 
the risks to women from abortion based on medical evidence in a 
trial record.218 Instead, the Court has stated that the public has 
an interest in protecting maternal health, but only in the 
abstract, as in the Casey decision in 1992, where the Court said 
that “[r]egulations designed to foster the health of a woman 
seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue 
burden.”219 Future cases may create an opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to review a real record on the risks of abortion to 
women, and the unregulated public health vacuum that the Court 
has allowed for forty years.220  
Reexamination of the medical mantra in Roe also raises some 
larger questions about the future of the Supreme Court and 
abortion. There are now four challenges to the mantra that 
“abortion is safer than childbirth”: (1) fundamental challenges to 
the dysfunctional abortion reporting system here in the United 
States where all data reporting is voluntary,221 (2) maternal 
mortality data showing an increasing rate of maternal mortality 
from abortion after the first trimester,222 (3) the growing body of 
international data on the long-term risks to women from 
abortion,223 and (4) maternal mortality data from other countries 
with better data collection and recordkeeping that show a higher 
rate of abortion mortality than maternal mortality.224  
Those challenges set up some possible paradigm shifts. How 
will the maternal mortality data and long-term risks data affect 
the consideration of maternal “health”? Will some sort of analysis 
                                                                                                     
 218. See Forsythe & Presser, supra note 14, at 90 (describing the original 
Jane Roe’s Rule 60(b) motion in McCorvey v. Hill where Circuit Judge Edith 
Jones reviewed the Court’s abortion jurisprudence and its lack of consideration 
of medical developments).   
 219. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
 220. See Forsythe & Kehr, supra note 13.  
 221. Supra note 118 and accompanying text.  
 222. Supra notes 119–19 and accompanying text. 
 223. Supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 224. Supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
THE MEDICAL ASSUMPTION 871 
balancing the risks of “delay” with the risk to women from the 
abortion be required? Will providers be required to demonstrate 
that the risks of not having the abortion outweigh the risks of 
having the abortion? If advocates contend that the principle 
underlying Roe is autonomy, not the relative safety of abortion, 
will the Supreme Court dismiss the data on the relative risks 
from abortion? Or will the Court allow the states to regulate or 
prohibit abortion at some gestational stage if providers cannot 
demonstrate that the risks of not having the abortion outweigh 
the risks of having the abortion? Unfortunately, the new 
paradigm will not be addressed in Horne, which was denied 
certiorari by the Supreme Court in January of 2014.225 
VI. Conclusion 
Federal Judge Henry Friendly put his finger on the Supreme 
Court’s errors in 1978 when he criticized the Court for the use of 
medical data in Roe and Doe that were not part of any record. He 
wrote:  
[T]he main lesson I wish to draw from the abortion cases 
relates to procedure—the use of social data offered . . . for the 
first time in the Supreme Court itself . . . . The Court’s 
conclusion in Roe that ‘mortality rates for women undergoing 
early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as 
low as or lower than the rates for normal childbirth’ rested 
entirely on materials not of record in the trial court, and that 
conclusion constituted the underpinning for the holding that 
the asserted interest of the state ‘in protecting the woman 
from an inherently hazardous procedure’ during the first 
trimester did not exist.226 
Friendly continued,  
If an administrative agency, even in a rulemaking proceeding, 
had used similar materials without having given the parties a 
fair opportunity to criticize or controvert them at the hearing 
stage, reversal would have come swiftly and inexorably . . . . 
                                                                                                     
 225. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-
402, 2014 WL 102430 (2014).  
 226. Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy: Substance and 
Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 36–37 (1978) (emphasis added). 
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The Court should set an example of proper procedure and not 
follow a course which it would condemn if pursued by any 
other tribunal.227 
These concerns, and the growth in international medical data 
over the past two decades since Casey, should counsel the 
Supreme Court to give greater deference to the states in their 
attempt to protect maternal health.  
                                                                                                     
 227. Id. at 37–38.  
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